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FLUSHED FROM THE POCKET:





NATIONAL Football League (NFL) quarterbacks Tom Brady,Russell Wilson, and Cam Newton were not the only ones whohad to contend with ferocious blitzes this past season. Television
viewers were hard pressed to escape the stifling rush of ads from pay-to-
play daily fantasy sports (DFS) websites. From January 1, 2015, through
December 14, 2015, FanDuel and DraftKings, comprising ninety-five per-
cent of the DFS market, spent more than $300 million combined in televi-
sion ads shown over 78,000 times.1 In the weeks leading up to the NFL’s
September season kick-off, the two companies accounted for more adver-
tising spending than the entire beer industry.2 But in the fourth quarter of
2015, FanDuel and DraftKings were left scrambling in the face of allega-
tions of insider trading and fraud, class action lawsuit filings, and investi-
gations into the overall legality of the DFS business model.3
Once viewed as a mere “online distraction” for “sports nerds,” an esti-
mated fifty-six million people played fantasy sports in North American in
2015.4 Industry analysts note that daily fantasy games, played by “only a
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2017; M.B.A., Texas A&M Univer-
sity 2008; B.A. in History, Texas A&M University 2002. The author would like to dedicate
this comment to his late grandfather, Judge Joseph B. Brown, Jr., a 1954 graduate of the
SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. Geoff Baker, DraftKings and FanDuel spend millions on fantasy sports advertising,
and it works, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015, 7:01 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/sports/
seahawks/draftkings-and-fanduel-spend-millions-on-fantasy-sports-advertising-and-it-
works/ [https://perma.cc/CEG2-RFFG]; Suzanne Vranica, Year in Review: The Best and
Worst Ads of 2015, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2015, 4:10 PM),), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
year-in-review-the-best-and-worst-ads-of-2015-1451262576?mod=pls_whats_news_us_busi
ness_f [https://perma.cc/YSF8-2N8C].
2. Tom Kludt, DraftKings and FanDuel ads seem to be everywhere on TV because
they are, CNN MONEY (Oct. 8, 2015, 5:23 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/08/media/
fanduel-draftkings-commercials/index.html [https://perma.cc/8E4J-9T2J].
3. See infra Parts II.C and III.C.
4. Drew Harwell, The rise of daily fantasy sports, online betting’s newest empire,
WASH. POST (July 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/07/28/
how-daily-fantasy-sites-became-pro-sports-newest-addiction-machine/ [https://perma.cc/
T4UF-N4Y8]. For comparison, in 1988 there were only 500,000 estimated fantasy sports
players in North America, and eighteen million players by 2006—the year the Unlawful
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small subset of traditional players,” generated around $2.6 billion in entry
fees in 2015—with the potential to grow 41% annually to $14.4 billion by
2020.5 Given the significant past and expected future growth of the DFS
industry, recent scrutiny by federal and state lawmakers is warranted.
Part II of this comment provides a brief overview of the history of fantasy
sports in the United States, an explanation of the differences between
traditional fantasy sports and pay-to-play daily fantasy sports, and a con-
text for understanding the recent concerns regarding the legality and lack
of regulation pertaining to DFS. Part III argues that states will increas-
ingly find that DFS constitutes illegal gambling; while some states will
attempt to legalize and regulate DFS, those regulations are likely pre-
empted by the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(PASPA). Part IV refutes the pronouncements by DFS proponents that
an exemption in the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
(UIGEA) for fantasy sports contests legalized DFS and discusses several
statutes that federal law enforcement could rely on to shut down DFS
operators. Part V suggests that federal lawmakers should either criminal-
ize or regulate DFS, as their efforts will be more efficient and provide
better consumer protection than if regulation is left to the states.
II. A BRIEF FANTASY SPORTS PRIMER
America’s fascination with fantasy sports dates back to the end of
World War II.6 In the late 1950s, Wilfred Winkenbach, who would later
create the first fantasy football league, devised a fantasy golf game
whereby participants selected teams comprised of real-life professional
golfers.7 The participant with the lowest combined stroke total at the end
of the tournament (based on the sum of the strokes taken by the actual
real-life golfers on the player’s fantasy team) was declared the winner.8
Modern fantasy baseball and fantasy football both evolved from early
1960s games in which fantasy points were awarded based on real-life
player statistics.9 The increased availability of sports statistics dissemi-
nated via the internet in the 1990s only furthered the growth of fantasy
sports.10
In 2014, the National Basketball Association (NBA) “signed a four-
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act was signed into law. Industry Demographics, FAN-
TASY SPORTS TRADE ASSOC., http://fsta.org/research/industry-demographics/ [https://
perma.cc/57NL-CU9B].
5. Darren Heitner, The Hyper Growth Of Daily Fantasy Sports Is Going To Change
Our Culture and Our Laws, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
darrenheitner/2015/09/16/the-hyper-growth-of-daily-fantasy-sports-is-going-to-change-our-
culture-and-our-laws/ [https://perma.cc/6QGB-9EG5].
6. Ray Vichot, History of Fantasy Sports and its Adoption by Sports Journalists, NEW-
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year deal with FanDuel and took a minor stake in the company.”11 Major
League Baseball (MLB), the National Hockey League (NHL), and Major
League Soccer (MLS) all have investment stakes in DraftKings (which
owns the exclusive right to market itself as MLB’s “Official Daily Fantasy
Game”).12 These strategic partnerships are a marked reversal from pro-
fessional sports leagues’ failed attempts dating back to the late 1990s to
suppress fantasy sports. A 1997 Second Circuit decision reversed a per-
manent injunction against Motorola and Sports Team Analysis and Track-
ing System (STATS) from selling a handheld pager called “SportsTrax”
that displayed updated live scores and statistics from NBA games.13 In
ruling against the NBA, the court distinguished between broadcasts of
sporting events, which are copyrightable, and “purely factual information
which any patron of an NBA game could acquire from the arena.”14 Ten
years later, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a declaratory judgment against
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, MLB’s interactive media and
Internet company, permitting C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, a ven-
dor of fantasy baseball products, to use the names and information about
MLB baseball players in its products without a license.15 The court noted
that C.B.C.’s fantasy baseball game used information readily available in
the public domain and remarked that “the public has an enduring fascina-
tion in the records set by former players . . . [and] the records and statis-
tics remain of interest to the public because they provide context that
allows fans to better appreciate or (deprecate) today’s performances.”16
Bowing to the popularity and economics of the fantasy sports industry,
professional sports leagues now embrace the positive synergies associated
with DFS by “leverag[ing] consumers’ cravings for fantasy content into
higher ratings, more viewership and engag[ment of] fans during non
prime-time games.”17 In a New York Times opinion article, NBA Com-
missioner Adam Silver advocated for the legalization and regulation of
professional sports betting—despite more than two decades of previous
opposition by the NBA and the league’s support for passage of the 1992
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).18
11. Harwell, supra note 4.
12. DraftKings Becomes the Official Daily Fantasy Game of Major League Baseball,
YAHOO! FINANCE (Apr. 2, 2015), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/draftkings-becomes-offi
cial-daily-fantasy-160400135.html [https://perma.cc/T3UH-RKAP]; Harwell, supra note 4.
13. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843–44 (2d Cir. 1997).
14. Id. at 847.
15. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505 F.3d
818, 820 (8th Cir. 2007).
16. Id. at 823.
17. Heitner, supra note 5.
18. Adam Silver, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-legalize-sports-
betting.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/FUP4-AFN7]. Except in a few states protected through
a grandfather provision, PASPA prohibits states from legalizing sports betting. See infra
Part III.C.
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A. TRADITIONAL FANTASY SPORTS PLAY
Traditional fantasy sports participants “own” and “manage” teams that
engage in fictional competitive leagues.19 Leagues can be comprised of
groups of friends or strangers.20 The specific mechanisms of league play
vary with the league, even within the same sport. However, all traditional
fantasy games share the same underlying goal—compete to win the most
points awarded based on the actual performance of real-life athletes on
the player’s fantasy roster.21 Specific league rules govern the number of
real-life players allowed on a fantasy player’s roster, as well as the distri-
bution by position.22 Fantasy points are awarded based on a real-life
player’s performance in a match or game.23 Participants thus endeavor to
“collect the most productive players across a variety of positions.”24
One of the hallmarks of traditional fantasy sports, and a major differ-
entiator between it and DFS, is season-long league play. A fantasy season
usually begins with a draft in which participants initially fill their fantasy
team’s roster.25 The three most common formats for conducting drafts
include: the “snake” format in which participants alternate between pick-
ing first and last in each round; the “auction” method in which all league
participants start with the same initial budget and bid for players; and the
“salary-cap” method in which all participants start with the same initial
budget, but rather than bidding against other participants, each partici-
pant purchases fantasy players who each have set fantasy salaries.26 The
salary-cap method allows for multiple owners to draft the same player.27
In “dynasty leagues,” participants select players with the intention of pos-
sibly keeping them on their rosters for multiple years.28
Another common characteristic of traditional fantasy sports not found
in DFS is exclusive ownership of players. Since no two participants can
19. Jim McCormick, So you want to play fantasy football?, ESPN (July 9, 2010), http://
espn.go.com/fantasy/football/ffl/story?page=nfldk2k10howtoplay [https://perma.cc/5Z2E-
QYGG].




22. Id. In Wilfred Winkenbach’s first fantasy football league in 1963, fantasy team ros-
ters were comprised of twenty players (four offensive ends, four halfbacks, two fullbacks,
two quarterbacks, two kick/punt returners, two field goal kickers, two defensive backs/
linebackers and two defensive linemen). Id.
23. Id. In Winkenbach’s original league, payoffs for scoring included: $.50 for a rush-
ing touchdown by any player; $.25 for any player receiving a pass for a touchdown; $.25 for
any player throwing a touchdown pass; $.25 for each field goal; $2.50 for a kickoff or punt
return for a touchdown; and $5.00 for a touchdown by a defensive lineman. Id.
24. McCormick, supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. Id.; Mem. from J. Brin Gibson, Bureau Chief of Gaming & Gov’t Affairs & Ketan
D. Bhirud, Head of Complex Litig., Nev. Att’y Gen., to A.G. Burnett, Chairman Nev.
Gaming Control Bd. & Nev. Gaming Control Bd. Members Terry Johnson & Shawn Reid
3 (Oct. 16, 2015), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=10487
[https://perma.cc/B2ZG-BMJH] [hereinafter Nev. Att’y Gen. Memo].
27. Nev. Att’y Gen. Memo, supra note 26.
28. McCormick, supra note 19.
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own the same player at the same time, much of the strategy and skill
behind traditional fantasy sports is the team owner acting as part scout,
part general manager, and part coach to draft, trade for, and play the
combination of players they believe will garner the most points through-
out the season.29 Long before the draft and commencement of league
play, dedicated participants devote time to “gaug[ing] where value lies
amongst the collective of . . . players.”30 This includes “collecting infor-
mation on injuries, position battles, [and] free agency.”31 Come draft day,
participants use their accumulated knowledge to decide which players to
draft—mindful that a backup player can impact a team’s success should a
star player succumb to injury.32 Once a season begins, owners strategize
weekly over which players to start and which to bench before the weekly
deadline to finalize rosters.33 In the end, diligent research and a sound
strategy can greatly increase a participant’s chance for success, but the
unpredictable nature of sports still plays a significant role in determining
the final standings at the end of a long season.34
B. DAILY FANTASY SPORTS PLAY
Unlike traditional fantasy sports, which track player performance over
the majority of a season, daily fantasy sports track player performance
only through the course of a single game.35 Additionally, most DFS sites
use the salary-cap draft method—thus permitting competing team owners
to own the same real-life players as other owners.36 As in traditional fan-
tasy sports, DFS sites require that participants lock in their lineups at a
set point before each individual game commences.37
There are many different types of DFS contests. In head-to-head
match-ups, one DFS player bets that his line-up will perform better than
one selected by another DFS player, and the winner receives the entire






34. In 2015, participants who drafted Andrew Luck based on his 2014 finish as the top-
rated fantasy quarterback were not so lucky as Luck struggled with injuries and played in
only seven games. See Quarterback Stats: 2014, FFTODAY (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.ff
today.com/stats/playerstats.php?Season=2014&GameWeek=&PosID=10&LeagueID=1
[https://perma.cc/7TLT-UGZK]; Andrew Luck Player Page, ROTOWORLD (Jan. 11, 2016),
http://www.rotoworld.com/player/nfl/6439/andrew-luck [https://perma.cc/Y8PH-85BQ].
35. Nev. Att’y Gen. Memo, supra note 26, at 2.
36. Id. at 3. Both DraftKings and FanDuel use the salary-cap method. Jason Spry,
DraftKings vs Fanduel Fantasy Football, DAILY FANTASY SPORTS 101 (Aug. 8, 2014), http:/
/www.dailyfantasysports101.com/draftkings-vs-fanduel-fantasy-football/ [https://perma.cc/
CF8M-W2QQ]. The possibility for multiple ownership of fantasy players quantitatively im-
pacts the predictive modeling used by some repeat DFS contest winners, and thus is signifi-
cant to the skill versus chance debate. See infra Part III.A.2.
37. Nev. Att’y Gen. Memo, supra note 26, at 2–3.
38. People v. Fanduel, Inc., 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521, at *13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
11, 2015); Nev. Att’y Gen. Memo, supra note 26, at 3.
506 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
owners.39 At the end of the tournament, players who achieve a certain
predetermined ranking are awarded a share of the payout pool.40 The
most popular DFS contests feature a guaranteed prize pool that fixes the
size of the prize pool regardless of how many people enter the contest.41
Participants pay “entrance fees” ranging from as low as $0.25 to as high
as $10,600 per contest.42 DFS site operators generate revenue by collect-
ing or “raking” a portion of these fees as “commission” on every
competition.43
C. CONTEXT FOR UNDERSTANDING THE RECENT MOUNTING
CONCERNS REGARDING THE FAIRNESS OF DAILY
FANTASY SPORTS
Fresh off the heels of a successful NFL season kick-off advertising cam-
paign, on October 5, 2015, the DFS industry was roiled by allegations of
insider trading. That day, DraftKings announced that an employee, de-
scribed as a mid-level content manager, won $350,000 at rival FanDuel
the same week the employee had also inadvertently released data before
39. Nev. Att’y Gen. Memo, supra note 26, at 3.
40. Id. at 3–4.
[T]he most common [tournaments] are (1) 50/50; (2) double-up; (3) triple-up/
quadruple-up/quintuple-up/etc.; and (4) top-X . . . . In a traditional 50/50 sim-
ulated game, an owner’s goal is to end up in the top half of total scores.
Owners who finish in the top half will equally split the payout pool. As a
result, half the owners will lose their entry fee and half the owners will win.
The winning owners, however, will not actually “double” their entry fee be-
cause the site operator will take a “rake” from every owner who partici-
pates . . . . By contrast, in a double-up simulated game, the site operator
might allow 110 owners into the simulated game, while only paying the own-
ers with the top 50 scores [thus permitting a true doubling of money] . . . .
Triple-up, quadruple-up, and quintuple-up simulated games are similar to
double-up simulated games, except that instead of the opportunity to double
their money, the owners have the opportunity to triple, quadruple, or quintu-
ple their money. For example, in a triple-up league, the top third splits the
payout pool . . . . In a top-X simulated game, which can consist of up to
thousands of owners, the owners finishing with a total score in the top-X (top
1, top 2, top 3, etc.) will split the payout pool (either evenly or with progres-
sively more based on how high they finish).
Id.
41. Dustin Gouker, Daily Fantasy Sports Basics – What is a Guaranteed Prize Pool
(GPP)?, DAILY FANTASY SPORTS CODES (Apr. 28, 2015, 21:32), http://dailyfantasysports.
codes/basics/daily-fantasy-basics-what-is-a-guaranteed-prize-pool-gpp/ [https://perma.cc/
U5YM-364C].
42. Fanduel, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521, at *12–13.
43. Id. at *13–14. The New York Attorney General (NYAG) contends that FanDuel
and DraftKings keep between 6% and more than 14% of the entry fees as commissions,
which the NYAG equates to the “rake” or “vig” charge collected on wagers by sports
bookies. Id. DFS proponents strongly reject the comparison of entry fees to bets or wagers.
See Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., No. 06-2768, 2007 WL 1797648, at *18–25 (D.N.J. June 20,
2007) (holding that “entry fees for [seasonal] fantasy sports leagues are not ‘bets’ or ‘wa-
gers’ because (1) the entry fees are paid unconditionally; (2) the prizes offered to fantasy
sports contestants are for amounts certain and are guaranteed to be awarded; and (3) [the
fantasy site operators] do not compete for the prizes.”) (emphasis added).
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lineups were locked prior to the start of the third week of NFL games.44
Daniel Wallach, a prominent sports and gambling lawyer, likened the al-
legations to insider trading and remarked that “[knowledge of other play-
ers’ roster selections] gives that person a distinct edge in a contest.”45
Both companies quickly released statements defending the integrity of
their businesses and barred their employees from competing in DFS.46
Despite FanDuel and DraftKings’s swift response, “[t]he episode has
raised questions about who at daily fantasy companies has access to valu-
able data, such as which players a majority of the money is being bet on;
how it is protected; and whether the industry can—or wants—to police
itself.”47 Shortly after the data leak, Adam Johnson filed the first class
action lawsuit against FanDuel and DraftKings, alleging negligence,
fraud, misrepresentation, and several other consumer protection and de-
ceptive trade practices related violations.48 However, one commentator
has noted that class adjudication may be barred by DraftKings’s arbitra-
tion provision which in pertinent part states:
[All claims] except for claims filed in a small claims court that pro-
ceed on an individual (non-class, non-representative) basis, shall be
settled by binding arbitration . . . . Any and all claims shall be arbi-
trated on an individual basis only, and shall not be consolidated or
joined with or in any arbitration or other proceeding involving a
Claim of any other party.49
On February 4, 2016, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
ordered the transfer of almost eighty class action lawsuits against DFS
44. Joe Drape & Jaqueline Williams, Scandal Erupts in Unregulated World of Fantasy
Sports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/sports/fanduel-draft
kings-fantasy-employees-bet-rivals.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/GGP6-WNYH]. The New
York Times reported that “records and interviews show a long-held pattern of overlapping
interests and close relationships among employees at the companies [FanDuel and DraftK-
ings]—many of whom regularly rank among the most consistent big winners—and in some
case investors.” Joe Drape & Jacqueline Williams, In Fantasy Sports, Signs of Insiders’
Edge, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/sports/fantasy-
sports-draftkings-fanduel-insiders-edge-football.html [https://perma.cc/EHP6-3R2K]. For
example, a DraftKings analytics manager won a $50,000 first prize in a 2015 FanDuel
hockey contest and a FanDuel employee who sets player prices won $50,000 in a June
DraftKings contest. Id.
45. Drape & Williams, Scandal Erupts in Unregulated World of Fantasy Sports, supra
note 44. Part III.A.2 discusses how knowledge of the percentages of fantasy players se-
lected by owners results in a statistical advantage.
46. Drape & Williams, In Fantasy Sports, Signs of Insiders’ Edge, supra note 44.
47. Drape & Williams, Scandal Erupts in Unregulated World of Fantasy Sports, supra
note 44.
48. First Am. Class Action Compl. at 1, 19–24, 27, 29–30, 32-34, Johnson v. Fanduel,
Inc., No. 15-cv-7963-GHW (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2015).
49. Andrew Phillips, Can DraftKings Dodge Class Action Via Arbitration?, LAW360
(Oct. 15, 2015, 1:49 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/714644/can-draftkings-dodge-class
-action-via-arbitration [https://perma.cc/S8DK-U7PC]. Since plaintiff Johnson did not con-
tract with FanDuel, there is no arbitration agreement between Johnson and FanDuel. Since
plaintiff Johnson did not contract with FanDuel, there is no arbitration agreement between
Johnson and FanDuel. Id.
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operators to a Massachusetts federal court.50
On October 27, 2015, the Fantasy Sports Trade Association (FSTA), an
“international organization dedicated to the advancement of fantasy
sports,” announced the formation of the Fantasy Sports Control Agency
(FSCA), “an independent agency charged with creating a strict, transpar-
ent and effective system of self-regulation for the businesses that com-
prise the fantasy sports industry.”51 Former Acting U.S. Secretary of
Labor Seth Harris will chair the FSCA.52
The allegations of insider trading, coupled with separate allegations of
using predatory tactics, have caught the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(FBI) attention.53 FBI agents are purportedly “examining whether
[DraftKings] encouraged and accepted deposits and bets from states
where the contests were prohibited.”54 Many federal lawmakers are also
advocating for federal investigation into DFS.55 In a letter to the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission, Democratic Senator
Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut wrote, “If employees are using in-
sider information to unfairly advantage themselves over others, this may
constitute fraud regardless of any other federal or state gambling stat-
utes.”56 Representative Hakeem Jeffries, Democrat of New York and a
House Judiciary Committee member, called for the committee to ex-
amine “whether permitting a multibillion-dollar industry to police itself
serves the best interests of the American people.”57
Given the sheer growth and magnitude of the DFS industry, a growing
number of state lawmakers and attorneys general recently commenced
investigations into the legality of DFS.58 As of May 5, 2016, attorneys
general in ten states have declared that DFS are illegal, or require a gam-
50. See In Re: Daily Fantasy Sports Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, MDL
No. 2677 (D. Mass. filed Feb. 4, 2016); Jessica Karmasek, Class actions filed against daily
fantasy sports websites consolidated, LEGALNEWSLINE.COM (Feb. 25, 2016, 10:05 AM),
http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510697161-class-actions-filed-against-daily-fantasy-sports-
websites-consolidated [https://perma.cc/L2G5-RVRP].
51. Press Release: Fantasy Sports Trade Association Appoints Former Acting U.S.
Secretary of Labor Seth D. Harris to Spearhead Fantasy Sports Control Agency, FANTASY




53. Joe Drape & Jacqueline Williams, Fantasy Sports Said to Attract F.B.I. Scrutiny,







58. See Dan Adams & Curt Woodward, As scrutiny rises, DraftKings under review
across US, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 26, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/12/
25/daily-fantasy-sports-under-scrutiny-around/2MWlnmn3tcUpDDMEAfR6NO/story.
html [https://perma.cc/WY5L-4GJG].
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bling license.59 But according to a Legal Sports Report tracker, at the
same time, legislation is pending in more than a dozen states to legalize
and regulate DFS.60 Part IV discusses state level legal approaches related
to DFS in more detail.
III. MOST STATES WILL CONCLUDE THAT DAILY FANTASY
SPORTS CONSTITUTES UNLAWFUL GAMBLING
Since news of the DraftKings data leak broke in October of 2015, attor-
neys general from New York, Nevada, Vermont, Georgia, Alabama,
Texas, Hawaii, Mississippi, and Illinois have all declared that DFS consti-
tutes illegal gambling in regards to their respective state gambling laws.61
Only the New York Attorney General has filed criminal proceedings,62
59. See Attorney General Opinions on Daily Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT,
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/state-legality-of-dfs/ [https://perma.cc/83X4-2G7W]. De-
spite issuance of many attorneys general opinions, DFS operators have declined to operate
in five other states. Id. The Tennessee Attorney General’s opinion declaring DFS illegal
was rendered moot after legislation was enacted legalizing DFS. Id.
60. See Legislative Tracker: Daily Fantasy Sports, Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS RE-
PORT, http://www.legalsportsreport.com/dfs-bill-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/P384-4SYR].
61. See News Advisory: Attorney General Determines Paid Daily Fantasy Sports Con-
tests Are Illegal Gambling, ALABAMA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Apr. 5, 2016),
http://www.ago.state.al.us/news/810.pdf [https://perma.cc/6H9G-HP92]; Letter from W.
Wright Banks, Jr., Ga. Deputy Att’y Gen., to Joseph J. Kim, Senior Vice-President and
Gen. Counsel, Ga. Lottery Corp., (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/advice-to-kim_20160226101748.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA5B-
98DM]; Haw. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 16-1 (Jan. 27, 2016), http://ag.hawaii.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/News-Release-2016-2.pdf) [https://perma.cc/F52A-G9Y6]; Ill. Att’y Gen.
Op. No. 15-006 (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/2015/15-
006.pdf [https://perma.cc/M52E-P3QF]; Miss. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2015-00445 (Jan. 29,
2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A.Godfrey_Jan.29-
2016-Fantasy-Sports-Wagering-in-the-state-of-Mississippi.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NSP-
6HB8]; Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0057 (Jan. 19, 2016), http://ag.hawaii.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/News-Release-2016-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3HW-CQSQ]; Nev. Att’y
Gen. Op., supra note 26; Notice to Cease and Desist And Notice of Proposed Litigation
from Eric Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen., to Jason Robins, CEO DraftKings, Inc. (Nov.
10, 2015), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2511147/final-nyag-draftkings-let
ter-11-10-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL78-VZCZ] [hereinafter N.Y. Att’y Gen. Cease and
Desist Notice]. While the Vermont Attorney General’s office did not issue a formal opin-
ion, John Treadwell, a state assistant attorney general stated in an interview that “daily
fantasy sports violate Vermont’s gambling laws.” Anthony Cabot & Karl Rutledge, CLI-
ENT ALERT: Recent Developments Concerning The Legality Of Daily Fantasy Sports In
Texas, Vermont and Maryland, LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER CHRISTIE (Jan. 19, 2016), http://
www.lrrc.com/client-alert-recent-developments-concerning-the-legality-of-daily-fantasy-
sports-in-texas-vermont-and-maryland [https://perma.cc/6X55-DUCL].
62. On November 10, 2015, New York Attorney General Schneiderman served
FanDuel and DraftKings with notices that they cease and desist from “illegally accepting
wagers in New York State in connection with [DFS games].” People v. Fanduel, Inc., 2015
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015). Three days later, both compa-
nies commenced separate actions against the NYAG seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief enjoining the NYAG “from taking any enforcement action or other action derived
from any allegation that the operation of daily sports contests are a violation of law.” Id. at
*5–6. On November 17th, the NYAG commenced action against DraftKings and FanDuel,
asserting nine different causing of actions. Id. at *6–7. On December 11th, New York Su-
preme Court Justice Manuel Mendez granted NYAG’s request for temporary injunctions
against the companies restraining them from “accepting entry fees, wagers or bets from
New York consumers,” but later that day, an appellate panel of New York’s Supreme
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but it is likely that more states will follow suit. Attorneys general in a few
other states have taken a different approach and declared DFS legal.63
While each states’ gambling laws are unique, there are many common-
alities associated with the legal tests used by states to determine whether
an activity constitutes gambling. Traditionally, at common law, three ele-
ments must be present for an activity to constitute unlawful gambling:
“(1) the award of a prize, (2) determined on the basis of chance, (3)
where consideration was paid.”64 In general, DFS proponents do not con-
test the notion that payments to DFS contest winners constitute “prizes.”
Thus under most state laws, the legality of DFS turns on whether DFS
contests satisfy the second and third elements of “chance” and “consider-
ation.” This part argues that despite various state-level formulations “im-
ply[ing] different degrees of permissiveness towards gambling,”65 most
state courts and executive law enforcement agencies will conclude that
DFS constitutes unlawful gambling under their respective laws. Further-
more, attempts by states to regulate DFS will likely be preempted by
PASPA.
A. SKILL PREDOMINATES OVER CHANCE
No issue related to DFS is more hotly contested than whether DFS
contests are games of skill or games of chance. Admittedly, advocates on
both sides of the issue present strong arguments. Illustrative of the diffi-
culty in settling this issue, one prominent gambling law commentator has
remarked, “In reality, of course, almost all human endeavors contain
some chance. Therefore, the issue then becomes how one determines
whether a betting activity will have a sufficient element of chance associ-
ated with it to rise to the level of a criminal offense.”66 States adhere to
Court temporarily stayed the injunctions. Id. at *26; Zachary Zagger, NY Appeals Court
Halts Injunction in Daily Fantasy Action, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://
www.law360.com/articles/745155/ny-appeals-court-halts-injunction-in-daily-fantasy-action
[https://perma.cc/P4MA-CVZJ]. The appellate panel issued a more permanent injunction
in favor of the DFS operators on the condition that their appeals be perfected for the May
2016 term. Zagger, supra note 62.
63. See e.g., Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin, R.I. Att’y Gen., to Gina Raimondo, Gov.
of R.I., M. Teresa Paiva Weed, Pres. of the R.I. S., Nicholas A. Mattiello, R.I. Speaker of
the H.R., (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
Rhode-Island-DFS-Opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5ST-K2CT] [hereinafter R.I. Att’y
Gen. Op.]; Steve Annear, Maura Healey says DraftKings operation is legal, BOSTON
GLOBE (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/10/07/healey-says-draft
kings-operation-legal-but-she-concerned-about-insider-trading/O0gcbQF3c6JuvFz2
SCHHfO/story.html?event=event25?event=event25 [https://perma.cc/3HY3-EP2G]. In re-
marks to a Boston Globe reporter, Mass. Att’y Gen. Maura Healy stated that “there [are]
no federal or state laws that prohibit daily fantasy sports sites from operating,” and that
DraftKings’ customers should not worry that they are violating the law. Annear, supra
note 63.
64. Anthony Cabot & Louis Csoka, Gaming Law Symposium Fantasy Sports: One
Form Of Mainstream Wagering In The United States, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1195, 1203
(2007).
65. See Steven Levitt, Thomas Miles & Andrew Rosenfield, Is Texas Hold ‘Em a
Game of Chance? A Legal and Economic Analysis, 101 GEO. L.J. 581, 593 (2013).
66. Cabot & Csoka, supra note 64, at 1203.
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one of several different tests to determine whether a contest constitutes
an illegal offense.67 In terms of decreasing leniency, these tests are the
“predominance” or “dominant factor” test, the “material element” test,
the “any chance” test, and the “gambling instinct” test.68 Regardless of
which test is used, courts and state attorneys general should not conclude
that DFS contests are games of skill.
1. Chance Tests
A majority of states adhere to the dominant factor or predominance
test, which turns on “whether the outcome of a particular contest is pre-
dominately within the control of a participant, or . . . predominantly sub-
ject to chance.”69 The difficulty in applying this test can be readily
comprehended by envisioning a sliding scale.70 On one end of the scale
are games like roulette and slots which rely solely on chance, and on the
other end are games relying almost entirely on skill, like chess.71 But DFS
lies in the “grey middle ground” of hybrid games which mix both ele-
ments of skill and chance.72 Comparably, some courts have found that
poker is a game of skill, while other courts have concluded it is a game of
chance.73
While no attorney general or court in a state applying the dominant
factor test has yet declared DFS illegal, Rhode Island has declared the
contests legal.74 In an opinion released February 4, 2016, the Attorney
General of Rhode Island, Peter Kilmartin, stated that while “DFS does
implicate certain provisions of existing civil and criminal statutes,” it
should be allowed to operate legally within the state.75 Kilmartin further
noted that “[t]he Supreme Court of Rhode Island has adopted the ‘domi-
nant factor’ test,” which he called “an especially high burden.”76 While a
small victory for DFS proponents, Kilmartin failed to offer any substan-
tive explanation to support his opinion that skill dominates over chance,
and instead advocated for regulation to address some of the social harms
caused by gambling and potential revenue generation for the state.77 Inci-
dentally, Rhode Island is home to the North American headquarters for
67. Daniel Wallach, Mass. AG Review May Spell Trouble For Daily Fantasy Sports,
LAW360 (Sept. 21, 2015, 11:34 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/705096/mass-ag-review
-may-spell-trouble-for-daily-fantasy-sports [https://perma.cc/45UU-RAD6].
68. See Cabot & Csoka, supra note 64, at 1205; Wallach, supra note 67.
69. Wallach, supra note 67.
70. See Levitt, supra note 65, at 6.
71. Cabot & Csoka, supra note 64, at 1204.
72. Id.
73. Cabot & Csoka, supra note 64, at 1204. Legendary poker player Doyle Brunson
has won a record ten World Series of Poker events, including two back-to-back world
championships—a rather statistically improbable series of occurrences if skill was not a
factor to some degree. History, DOYLE BRUNSON, http://www.doylebrunson.com/history
[https://perma.cc/877B-KNZM].
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International Game Technologies’s (IGT) lottery and gaming business
unit.78 IGT is “the world’s largest lottery-systems provider” and one of
the largest private employers in the state.79 The creation of state-run DFS
lotteries could result in increased business for IGT, thereby benefitting
the state as a whole.
Commentators have noted that if DFS contests are found to rely pre-
dominately on chance under the most “DFS friendly,” dominant factor
test, then such contests would presumably be considered illegal under the
other stricter tests.80 Arguably, the closest a court has come to applying
the dominant factor test to daily fantasy sports contests is the Supreme
Court of Washington in Seattle Times v. Tielsch.81 The contest at issue in
Tielsch involved a football forecasting contest in which participants com-
peted to select the results from twenty football games played each week
over the course of a nine-week period.82 Contestants who submitted en-
tries correctly picking the winner from all twenty contests in a single
week received $1,000.83 In noting how “[t]he result of a football game
may depend upon weather, the physical condition of the players and the
psychological attitude of the players,” the court concluded that chance
was the dominant factor in the contest.84 While the nature of the contest
in Tielsch differs from that in DFS, the case provides persuasive authority
for future courts in dominant factor jurisdictions on where to place DFS
along the skill versus chance spectrum.
A subtle variation of the dominant factor test is the material element
test, in which a game may be considered illegal if “chance has more than
a mere incidental effect on the game.”85 New York, which adheres to the
material element test defines “contest of chance” as any “contest, game,
gaming scheme or gaming devise in which the outcome depends in a ma-
terial degree upon an element of chance, notwithstanding that skill of the
contestant may also be a factor therein.”86 In the old computer game
Minesweeper, “a great deal of skill is generally exercised by players, but
there are moments when players are forced to guess at random, with the
results of that guess determining the winner and loser of the game. Skill
78. John Kostrzewa, As part of $6B merger, GTECH to rebrand as IFT, ‘shuffle’ work-
ers, PROVIDENCE J. (Mar. 15, 2015, 10:25 AM), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/
20150315/NEWS/150319504 [https://perma.cc/6QZ3-JWLA].
79. See id.; R.I. Dep’t of Labor and Training, Labor Market Information, R.I.’s Larg-
est Employers, http://www.dlt.ri.gov/lmi/es202/largestemp.htm [https://perma.cc/TS3N-XJ
QB]. IGT merged with GTECH Corporation in 2015. Kostrezewa, supra note 78.
80. Wallach, supra note 67.
81. See Seattle Times Co. v. Tielsch, 495 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Wash. 1972).
82. Id. at 1366–67.
83. Id. at 1367.
84. Id. at 1367, 1370–71; see also Commonwealth v. Laniewski, 173 Pa. Super. 245,
249–51 (1953) (concluding that chance was the dominant factor in football forecasting
game).
85. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Fanduel’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunc-
tion, and in Further Support of the NYAG’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 25,
Fanduel, Inc. v. Schneiderman, No. 1616912015, 2015 WL 4320417, at *1 (N.Y. Supp. Nov.
24, 2015).
86. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.00(1) (Consol. 2016) (emphasis added).
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predominates, but chance plays the material role in determining the
game’s outcome.”87
A minority of states follow the any chance test, which finds contests
“illegal if results are based even in the smallest part on chance.”88 In an
opinion declaring DFS illegal, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton
noted, “Texas law does not require that skill predominate . . . . If an ele-
ment of chance is involved in a particular game, it is embraced within the
definition of ‘bet.’”89 It will be difficult for DFS operators to fend off
legal challenges in states that use the any chance test and the gambling
instinct test discussed below because they render moot DFS operators’
arguments related to skill.90 This author has failed to find any statements
attributable to FanDuel and DraftKings denying the existence of at least
some element of chance in determining contest outcomes.91
A close variant of the any chance test is the gambling instinct test. It is
the strictest of the various tests and prohibits activities that appeal to a
player’s gambling instinct—regardless of whether the game is one of skill
or one of chance.92 In Hawaii, which follows the gambling instinct test,
“playing a game, whether of skill or chance, for money or other thing of
value constitutes . . . gambling.”93 Even if DFS operators could establish
that their contests are 100% skills based, jurisdictions employing this test
would still likely consider the games to constitute gambling since players
pay entry fees for the prospect of winning money. DFS operators could
try and argue that DFS participants are not playing DFS for the money,
but instead playing for the positive externalities some commentators have
87. The Legality of Skill Gaming, SKILLZ (Apr. 19, 2016, 17:52), https://
skillz.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/200620348-The-Legality-of-Skill-Gaming [https://
perma.cc/4ABL-DNPW].
88. Marc Edelman, Is It Legal To Play Fantasy Football For Money?, FORBES (Sept. 3,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2013/09/03/is-it-legal-to-play-fantasy-foot
ball-for-money/#461693b957dc [https://perma.cc/R8R7-2AS2].
89. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 61, at 4. See also State v. Gambling Device, 859
S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (“[I]t is the incorpora-
tion of chance that is the essential element of a gambling device, not the incorporation of a
particular proportion of chance and skill.”).
90. Despite Tennessee’s adoption of the any chance test, the recently enacted “Fantasy
Sports Act declares DFS contests to be ‘primarily’ based on skill and explicitly excludes
them from the state’s definition of gambling,” thus rendering moot Tenn. Att’y Gen. Her-
bert Slatery’s opinion that “fantasy sports contests constitute illegal gambling because they
are ‘contingent on some degree of chance.’” Godwin Proctor LLP, Good Things Happen
In Threes: Tennessee Becomes Third State To Enact DFS Law, JD SUPRA (May 2, 2016),
https://perma.cc/F5MZ-FFCN; Godwin Proctor LLP, Alabama and Tennessee AGs Issue
Opinions on Fantasy Sports, JD SUPRA (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
alabama-and-tennessee-ags-issue-17445/ [https://perma.cc/73HL-MF8K].
91. DraftKings’s complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Ill. Att’y
Gen. Lisa Madigan contains perhaps a slight admission that chance plays some role in the
outcome of DFS contests: “[F]antasy results are based on statistics compiled by real-world
athletes, but are never mere proxies for the binary outcomes of real-world sporting
events.” Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief at 9, Draftkings, Inc. v. Madigan, No.
2015CH18622, Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct., Ch. Div. (Dec. 24, 2015).
92. Cabot & Csoka, supra note 64, at 1205.
93. State v. Prevo, 361 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Haw. 1961); Cabot & Csoka, supra note 64, at
1205 n.66.
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associated with DFS.94 But such an argument would be absurd in the face
of FanDuel and DraftKings’ marketing and advertising strategies which
tout the possibility of winning real money, perhaps “in life changing
amounts.”95 Arguably, the whole reason behind the recent growth in the
DFS industry is because operators like FanDuel and DraftKings explicitly
appeal to the gambling instinct of participants with promises of winning
cash.
2. Courts Base Determinations of Chance on Qualitative, Not
Quantitative Factors
Given the low likelihood that DFS operators will convince courts that
DFS contests are 100% skill based, or alternatively that they do not ap-
peal in any way to players’ gambling instinct, the skill versus chance de-
bate is most applicable in jurisdictions that adhere to the dominant factor
and material element tests. So how do courts determine whether skill pre-
dominates over chance? Historically, courts have answered this question
“in the qualitative or causative sense, rather than the quantitative
sense.”96 Nevertheless, DFS proponents generally offer quantitative sup-
port to back their proposition that skill predominates over chance.97
After the federal government shutdown the Internet poker industry in
2006,98 noted economist Steven Levitt, and legal scholars Thomas Miles
and Andrew Rosenfield, conducted extensive empirical analysis on the
role of skill versus luck in online poker.99 The authors sorted through
data based on over twelve million hands of real-money no-limit Texas
Hold ‘Em poker.100 The results of their analysis were consistent with the
notion that skill plays some role in poker.101 For example, the authors
found that “[e]ven tiny differences in skill manifest themselves in near
certain victory if the time horizon is long enough.”102 DFS operators cite
the results of their own empirical analysis to show that highly skilled DFS
players beat lower skilled players.103
Following Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan’s DFS opinion,
DraftKings initiated a suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief stipu-
94. See Jon Boswell, Note, Fantasy Sports: A Game of Skill that is now Implicitly Legal
Under State Law, and now Explicitly Legal Under Federal Law, 25 CARDOZA ARTS & ENT
L.J. 1257, 1277 (2008) (noting that many people participate in fantasy leagues for the
“strong social value” and “intimate, friendly competition between friends and family”).
95. See e.g., Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. at 9–10, People v.
Fanduel, Inc., 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015). “He’s a personal
trainer, and he turned $2 into over $2 million on FanDuel.” Id. at 10.
96. See Levitt et al., supra note 65, at 593.
97. See e.g., Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief, Draftkings, Inc. v. Madigan, No.
2015CH18622, at ¶ 54.
98. See infra Part IV.
99. See Levitt et al., supra note 65 at 584.
100. Id. at 620.
101. Id. at 633.
102. Id. at 634.
103. See Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief, Draftkings, Inc. v. Madigan, No.
2015CH18622, at ¶ 54.
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lating that their activities are lawful.104 They allege that only skill can
account for the repeat nature with which certain players win DFS con-
tests.105 For example, the complaint cites one study that found that “in
the first half of the 2015 MLB season, 91% of DFS player profits were
won by just 1.3% of players.”106 The study’s authors identified two meth-
ods which they believe enabled skilled users to succeed over unskilled
users:
(1) skilled users employ lineups that create covariance by choosing
multiple athletes from the same real-life team in order to produce
the extreme DFS outcomes—good and bad—that are necessary to
win a large field tournament; and (2) skilled users exploit salary cap
pricing inefficiencies by using sophisticated models to optimize their
lineups by projecting which athletes are most likely to under- or
over-perform relative to their salary on a given day.107
To show “the degree of control DFS users exercise over their out-
comes,” DraftKings cites results from “sophisticated computer simula-
tions” showing that, when compared to randomly generated lineups,
“skilled users dramatically outperformed the computer simulation in
head-to-head contests: [sic] 96% of the time in NBA, 84% of the time in
NFL, 83% of the time in MLB, and 82% of the time in NHL.”108 A
Rotogrinders analysis conducted for Bloomberg showed that “the top 100
ranked players enter 330 winning lineups per day, and the top 10 players
combine to win an average of 873 times daily. The remaining field of
approximately 20,000 players tracked by Rotogrinders win just 13 times
per day, on average.”109 In fall 2015, the media was filled with stories
about DFS players whose cumulative winnings totaled in the five and six
figures.110 Commentators note that savvy DFS players use complex statis-
tical models to find pricing inefficiencies associated with fantasy player
salary-cap prices, and then exploit this knowledge by entering into as
many contests as possible—including contests with new and unskilled
104. Id. at ¶¶ 1–2.
105. See id.
106. Id. at ¶ 54. The same study found that “the top 11 players paid $2 million in entry
fees and made profits of $135,000 each while accounting for 17 percent of all entry fees.”
Drape & Williams, In Fantasy Sports, Signs of Insiders’ Edge, supra note 44.
107. Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief, Madigan, No. 2015CH18622, at ¶ 55.
108. Id. at ¶¶ 56–57.
109. Joshua Brustein & Ira Boudway, You Aren’t Good Enough to Win Money Playing
Daily Fantasy Football, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2015-09-10/you-aren-t-good-enough-to-win-money-playing-daily-
fantasy-football [https://perma.cc/SA8B-LKHJ].
110. See e.g., Brad Reagan, A Fantasy Sports Wizard’s Winning Formula, WALL ST. J.
(June 4, 2014, 10:54 AM),  http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-fantasy-sports-wizards-winning-
formula-wsj-money-june-2014-1401893587 [https://perma.cc/AZK5-YVGB] (profiling a 29
year-old graduate student who spends his evenings playing DFS, and who won more than
$100,000 on a single NFL Sunday using a self-developed complex algorithm to select play-
ers); Brustein & Boudway, supra note 109 (profiling a 31 year-old accountant who spends
as much $8,000 in contest entry fees on a typical NFL Sunday, and who claims to win in the
high five to low six figure dollar range per year).
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participants.111 A fundamental input into these statistical models—which
illustrates the concerns related to the DraftKings data leak and stories of
success from DFS employees competing in DFS contests—is the distribu-
tion of real-life player ownership on fantasy players’ rosters.112 Many
DFS players fill their fantasy rosters with star players, resulting in similar
point totals.113 Highly skilled DFS players supplement their roster selec-
tions with less popular players in the hope that the lesser selected players
have good performances—thus allowing skilled DFS players to achieve
point totals that breakout from the mean.114
Similar to the results from Levitt’s empirical poker analysis, these sta-
tistics suggest that skill plays some role in DFS contest outcomes. But
despite this statistical evidence, “courts have rejected the notion that cal-
culating probabilities and handicapping odds convert a ‘contest of chance’
into a game of skill.”115 As New York Attorney General Eric Schneider-
man notes, “handicapping and evaluating odds is fundamental to every
form of sports and horserace betting.”116 DFS operators’ quantitative sta-
tistics are also less convincing when one looks at the frequency with
which “a skilled player consistently beats an unskilled player.”117 In refer-
ence to a FanDuel study that found that “the top 10% of players beat the
bottom 90% just 59% of the time,” Schneiderman points out that “DFS
simply does not compare to a game of skill, like chess, where a skilled
player consistently beats an unskilled player.”118 FanDuel’s study suggests
that the complex algorithms employed by top players provide only a mar-
ginal advantage over unskilled players in the short run, yielding profitable
returns only over multiple rounds of play. The study also helps explain
why top players sometimes enter more than 800 contests per day (i.e., the
skill advantage is so slight that profitable returns can only be exploited
through many iterations).119
111. Ed Miller & Daniel Singer, For daily fantasy sports operators, the curse of too
much skill, SPORTS BUS. J. (July 27, 2015), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Is
sues/2015/07/27/Opinion/From-the-Field-of-Fantasy-Sports.aspx [https://perma.cc/LL4E-
AXA4]. There is arguably more protection for novices in traditional casino games, because
a novice player can elect to gamble in a low stakes game in which a high stakes, skilled
gambler would not find it worth their time to participate. Id. On the other hand, a skilled
DFS player may enter the same small buy-in tournament (populated with recreational
players) several hundred times. Id.
112. See Jeremy Greenfield, How to Cheat—and Win—at Daily Fantasy Football, THE
STREET (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.thestreet.com/story/13327452/1/how-to-cheat-and-win-
at-daily-fantasy-football.html [https://perma.cc/3NLR-XFZS] (“Quantifying exactly how
much knowledge of ownership distributions would help a bettor requires modeling odds of
points and salary cost along with this prior distribution. The practice of including prior
certainties of specific factors in an equation is known as Bayesian statistical inference.”).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. at 25, People v. Fanduel, Inc.,
2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015).
116. Id. (emphasis in original).
117. See id. (emphasis in original).
118. Id. (emphasis in original).
119. See Brustein & Boudway, supra note 109.
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One of the common themes among the recent attorneys general opin-
ions is the qualitative-based conclusion that DFS contests are games of
chance because the outcomes are the result of future contingent events
beyond the influence of participants.120 New York’s Attorney General
has noted that “[a] player injury, a slump, a rained out game, even a ball
taking a bad hop, can each dictate whether a bet wins or loses” and that
“[g]iven the frequency and number of chance occurrences, no amount of
research, investigation, or judgment can assure in advance that a certain
DFS result will occur or how.”121 Similarly, Texas Attorney General Ken
Paxton supported his decision to declare DFS unlawful by alluding to
actual occurrences from recent professional sporting events that altered
the outcome of the game, which would have be unpredictable to a DFS
player (e.g. Dez Bryant’s controversial no-catch and the Deflatgate
scandal).122
For their part, proponents of DFS counter by claiming that contestants
must have “an intensive knowledge of various sports, rules, athletes, and
statistics” as well as the ability to “understand and incorporate into their
gameplay the different rules and features of the fantasy contests them-
selves that require and reward different strategies.”123 DFS proponents
further argue that players must “skillfully manage a salary cap, identify
‘value’ players who outperform their assigned salary, master a complex
scoring system, and modify their strategies based on the structure of the
contest itself.”124 Perhaps the Nevada Attorney General’s opinion offers
the simplest explanation on why DFS contests are predominately con-
trolled by chance occurrences:
With daily fantasy sports, although the owners select a lineup for
their simulated team, the owners have no ability to control how
many points their simulated teams receive from an actual player’s
performance. The actual players in the actual games control their
own performance. As a result, after an owner places a bet and sets a
final lineup, the owner simply waits to see what happens based upon
the performance of the actual players involved.125
In this context, when DFS players select lineups, they merely use his-
torical data to create forecasts for how players will perform in the future.
Players seeking to increase the “rarity score” of their roster make addi-
tional guesses as to the distribution of fantasy player selection by other
DFS players.126 One can call it forecasting, predicting, guessing, or esti-
mating, but no amount of effort or control on the part of a DFS player
120. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. at 1, Fanduel, Inc., 2015 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 4521.
121. Id. at 2.
122. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 61, at 4–5.
123. Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief at ¶ 9, Draftkings, Inc. v. Madigan, No.
2015CH18622.
124. Id.
125. Nev. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 26, at 16.
126. See Greenfield, supra note 112.
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can influence the outcome of the contest once it has commenced, much
less influence the performance of the real athletes involved. Since no
quantitative framework currently exists to measure the relative amounts
of skill and chance in DFS, courts should continue to base their decisions
on whether an activity constitutes gambling on the qualitative factors
which show that DFS contest outcomes are determined by events occur-
ring beyond the control of the DFS player.
B. CONSIDERATION: DFS CONTEST ENTRY FEES ARE BETS AND
WAGERS
DFS operators have defended the legality of their business by challeng-
ing the assertion that contest entry fees constitute bets or wagers within
the meaning of state gambling statutes—thus negating the common law
element of consideration.127 This argument has found a sympathetic ear
with some courts, although not in lawsuits directly pertaining to the legal-
ity of DFS. In Langone v. Kaiser, a federal district court in Illinois dis-
missed a suit to recover gambling winnings from FanDuel under the
Illinois Loss Recovery Act.128 The act permits persons, who by gambling,
lose “any sum of money or thing of value” to collect such money or thing
of value in a civil action against the “winner.”129 In dismissing the suit,
the court held that FanDuel was not a “winner” within the meaning of the
act because it did not risk anything when it collected entry fees from par-
ticipants.130 In declining to consider the entry fees as wagers, the court
noted: “FanDuel acts as the conduit for transmission of the prize to the
winner, but . . . does not risk any of its money in producing the prize
money.”131
In a similar case, Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc., a New Jersey district court
dismissed a suit which alleged that traditional fantasy sports league con-
test entry fees constituted bets or wagers (the suit sought recovery of en-
try fees under New Jersey’s qui tam gambling loss-recovery statute).132
The court articulated “that it would be ‘patently absurd’ to hold that ‘the
combination of an entry fee and a prize equals gambling’” and distin-
guished a “bet” (“a situation in which the money or prize belongs to the
persons posting it, each of whom has a chance to win it”) from a “prize”
(“money or other prize [which] belongs to the person offering it, who has
no chance to win it and who is unconditionally obligated to pay it to the
successful contestant”).133 Since “(1) the entry fees [were] paid uncondi-
tionally; (2) the prizes offered to fantasy sports contestants [were] for
amounts certain and [were] guaranteed to be awarded; and (3) Defend-
ants [did] not compete for prizes,” the entry fees were not found to be
127. Compl. for Decl. and Inj. Relief at ¶ 8, Madigan, No. 2015CH18622.
128. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145941, at *23–24 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2013).
129. Id. at *3.
130. Id. at *17–21.
131. Id. at *19.
132. See No. 06-2768, 2007 WL 1797648, at *5–6 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007).
133. Id. at *19, *21.
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bets or wagers.134
As promising as the holdings in these two cases might sound to propo-
nents of DFS, they are distinguishable from the issue of whether entry
fees constitute bets or wagers with respect to state gambling laws. In
granting New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s request for a
preliminary injunction against DraftKings and FanDuel, Justice Mendez
noted that Humphrey pertained to a nonrefundable one-time, season-
long fantasy sports entry fee.135 Additionally, the logic in which the
Langone and Humphrey courts used to support their holdings is only ap-
plicable within the context of the specific qui tam statutes at issue. For
example, the Langone court did not actually reject Langone’s argument
that FanDuel engaged in gambling because it sold sports pools.136
Langone analogized:
A “Daily Fantasy” transaction is much like a horse-racing wager. The
bettor buys a ticket, [c]hoosing a number of horses. The money wa-
gered is pooled by the racetrack. The racetrack wins money on every
wager. But the racetrack loses money on every race when it pays the
winning wagers. The Racetrack always wins more than it loses. Thus
the bettors always lose to the racetrack.137
The court never refutes Langone’s analogy, instead, stating that
whether or not FanDuel’s activities could be characterized as “selling
pools” was irrelevant for the purpose of the Loss Recovery Act.138 Thus
the holding in Langone does not stand for the blanket proposition that
entry fees are not bets or wagers. Few, if any, would dispute that the
money paid at a horse track for horses to win, place, or show is not a bet.
The logic behind this analogy is simply no different than that behind the
payment of entry fees for DFS contests. In fact, there is a term for this
specific type of gambling: pari-mutuel betting.139
Even accepting as true the requirement that a DFS operator must
stand to lose something of value for an entry fee to be a bet,140 there is an
argument that with guaranteed prize pools such an occurrence can result.
As described in Part I, in guaranteed prize pool contests the prize amount
is paid out regardless of how many participants enter the contest. When a
DFS operator collects less in entry fees than it has guaranteed to pay out,
134. Id. at *24–25.
135. People v. Fanduel, Inc., 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521, at *16–17 (N.Y. Supp. Ct.
Dec. 11, 2015).
136. See Langone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145941, at *22.
137. Id. at *21–22.
138. Id. at *22.
139. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines pari-mutuel as “a betting pool in which
those who bet on competitors finishing in the first three places share the total amount bet
minus a percentage for the management.” See Pari-Mutuel, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pari%E2%80%93mutuel [https://perma.cc/3D2D-
878U].
140. See Langone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145941, at *23 (“Since FanDuel does not risk
its own money on the fantasy games it cannot be a winner or loser under the Loss Recov-
ery Act.”).
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an overlay results and the operator eats the difference out of their profits.
In this respect, perhaps DFS companies do risk something of value.
DFS operators are also unlikely to escape the specific statutory lan-
guage defining “betting” or “wagering” contained in many state gambling
statutes. For example, in Nevada, a wager is defined as “a sum of money
or representative of value that is risked on an occurrence for which the
outcome is uncertain.”141 In Texas, a bet means “an agreement to win or
lose something of value solely or partially by chance.”142 Illinois’s statute
uses the language “money or other thing of value.”143 And in New York,
the statutory definition of gambling includes “stak[ing] or risk[ing] some-
thing of value.”144 One thing these statutes all have in common is that
there is no requirement that all parties to the transaction stand to win or
lose something.145 In People v. Fanduel, Inc., Justice Mendez noted,
“[t]he payment of an “entry fee” as high as $10,600 on one or more con-
tests daily could certainly be deemed risking ‘something of value.’”146
DraftKings’s own data shows that a majority of players are net losers and
that “89.3% of DFS players had a negative return on investment across
2013 and 2014,”147 meaning that most players are not recouping the cost
of their contest entry fees and losing something of value. Nevada’s Attor-
ney General offers perhaps the simple explanation for why entry fees are
wagers:
[F]antasy sports owners pay money to play the simulated games . . . .
If an owner wins, the owner gets money back. If an owner loses, the
owner loses the bet made. When owners play against each other,
some will win and some will lose. Thus, because owners risk money
on an occurrence for which the outcome is uncertain, wagers are
present.”148
Despite the holdings in Humphrey and Langone,149 DFS proponents
will have a hard time convincing lawmakers and courts that entry fees are
not bets or wagers, especially in the face of statutory language containing
“staking or risking something of value.” Interestingly, neither the federal
Wire Act nor the Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA), which are dis-
cussed in Part IV, define bet or “wager.”150 Nevertheless, the common
law in almost all jurisdictions provides that monetary payments constitute
141. NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.01962 (Lexis-Nexis 2016).
142. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 47.01(1) (West 2015).
143. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 720 ILCS 5/28-1(a)(1) (West 2016).
144. NY PENAL LAW § 225.00(2) (Consol. 2016).
145. But cf. Langone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145941, at *23; Humphrey v. Viacom, Inc.,
No. 06-2768, 2007 WL 1797648, at *24 (D.N.J. June 20, 2007).
146. 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521, at *17 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015).
147. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. at 10, People v. Fanduel, Inc.,
2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015).
148. Nev. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 26, at 9.
149. See Langone, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145941, at *23; Humphrey, No. 06-2768, 2007
WL 1797648, at *24.
150. See infra Part IV.
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valid consideration.151 And while the IGBA does not define bet or wager,
it does define unlawful gambling to include pool-selling.152
Perhaps the clearest evidence that contest entry fees are bets or wagers
is found in DFS operators’ own advertising and public statements. In an
interview on the website Reddit entitled “Ask Me Anything,” DraftK-
ings’s CEO bluntly stated, “[The] concept is a mashup between poker and
fantasy sports. Basically, you pick a team, deposit your wager, and if your
team wins, you get the pot.”153 DraftKings has also embedded gambling
keywords into its website’s programming code to increase the likelihood
that internet search engines will send users looking for gambling directly
to DraftKings’s site.154 In the United Kingdom, both FanDuel and
DraftKings have applied for and received licenses from the U.K. Gam-
bling Commission, yet each company denies that the same business activi-
ties constitute gambling in the United States.155 In noting that courts are
often willing to look beyond creative labels used to disguise gambling
terms, one commentator has proffered that “it would seem fairly straight-
forward to conclude that DraftKings’ and FanDuel’s customers are pay-
ing entry fees in order to win cash prizes, and not just simply ‘for the
privilege of entering the [DFS] contest.’”156
Lastly, in some states like Texas and Illinois, there is a sub-issue as to
whether DFS players are the “actual contestants” in a “bona fide” con-
test. For example, Illinois provides an exemption from the general prohi-
bition on gambling for “[o]ffers of prizes, award or compensation to the
actual contestants in any bona fide contest for the determination of skill,
speed, strength or endurance or to the owners of animals or vehicles en-
tered in such contests.”157 Under this exemption, it would be permissible
for a golfer to wager on a golf game played with the other members of his
foursome, but unlawful for a non-playing spectator to make the same wa-
ger. DraftKings maintains that “[t]he athletes themselves are not compet-
ing in the DFS contest; their statistical performance is merely a piece of
the DFS puzzle that DFS players must assemble.”158 Thus DraftKings
seeks to shift the focus away from the actual sporting events, and instead
151. I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: An Introduction to the Law of Internet
Gambling, 10 UNLV GAMING RESEARCH & REV. J. 1, 2 (2006).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(4) (1970); Nev. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 26, at 6 (DFS
contests are “sports pools” under Nev. Rev. Stat. 463.0193). DFS entry fees have also been
described as “‘parlay’ bets contingent on combinations of games and ‘prop’ bets relying on
statistics.” People v. Fanduel, Inc., 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521, at *13 (N.Y. Supp. Ct.
Dec. 11, 2015).
153. See Ask Me Anything, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/x5zrn/
we_quit_our_jobs_to_pursue_a_dream_of_starting_a/ [https://perma.cc/T8CB-M8PN] (em-
phasis added).
154. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. at 8–9, People v. Fanduel,
Inc., 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015).
155. Id. at 9.
156. Daniel Wallach, Everything You Need To Know About The Illinois Daily Fantasy
Sports Legal Battle, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Jan. 4, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://
www.legalsportsreport.com/7106/illinois-dfs-primer/ [https://perma.cc/GP5S-59CT].
157. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 720, ILCS 5/28-1(a)(1) (West 2016).
158. Wallach, supra note 156.
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redefine the contest at issue as the matchup between DFS participants.
This argument is not likely to gain traction with courts because, in gen-
eral, courts have “drawn a distinction between ‘actually participating’ in a
contest and being able to control or affect its outcome versus ‘forecasting’
the result of a contest involving others.”159 It intuitively makes much
more sense to say that DFS participants merely forecast the result of a
contest involving others than to say that their wagering against other par-
ticipants is the contest itself.
C. RUNNING AFOUL OF PASPA
Given the significant popularity and growth in the DFS industry, many
lawmakers, commentators, and even DFS operators advocate that the fu-
ture legality of DFS should rest with individual state-level regulation.160
The previously hostile relationship between the fantasy sports industry,
media companies, and professional sports leagues has evolved into one of
strategic partnerships with lucrative multi-million dollar sponsorships.161
Legislation legalizing and regulating DFS has passed in four states, and
is pending in at least a dozen other states.162 Generally, the regulations
seek to protect consumers, increase revenues for the state, or both. For
example, a bill currently in the California Senate would allow DFS com-
panies to lawfully operate within the state, provided they first register
with the state and pay an annual regulatory fee.163 Indiana’s recently
passed legislation allows DFS companies to lawfully operate if they pay a
159. Id. See also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 61, at 2; Ill. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note
61, at 12–13.
160. See supra Part I; Andy Moore, Does Regulation of Fantasy Sports Violate
PAPSA?, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2015, 10:24 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/734823/does-
state-regulation-of-fantasy-sports-violate-paspa.; Sharon Terlep, FanDuel CEO Calls for
Government Regulation [https://perma.cc/S754-28LV]; Sharon Terlep, FanDuel CEO Calls
for Government Regulation, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fan
duel-ceo-calls-for-government-regulation-1446127412?alg=Y [https://perma.cc/5Y83-ZZ
2R].
161. See Harwell, supra note 4; DraftKings Becomes the Official Daily Fantasy Game of
Major League Baseball, supra note 12. Both Jerry Jones, owner of the Dallas Cowboys, and
the Kraft Group, the ownership group for the New England Patriots, have investment
stakes in DraftKings. Darren Rovell, Jerry Jones defends DraftKings stake: It ‘creates more
interest’, ESPN (Oct. 26, 2015), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/13974122/jerry-jones-dallas
-cowboys-defends-investment-draftkings [https://perma.cc/Y6NB-QPTQ]. Media compa-
nies like Fox, Time Warner, NBC Sports Ventures, and Comcast Venutes, and private-
equity groups like KKR and Google Capital have invested in either FanDuel or DraftK-
ings. David Purdum & Darren Rovell, N.Y. AG declares DraftKings, FanDuel are illegal
gambling, not fantasy, ESPN (Nov. 11, 2015), http://espn.go.com/chalk/story/_/id/14100780/
new-york-attorney-general-declares-daily-fantasy-sports-gambling [https://perma.cc/3FXY-
FYE4].
162. See Legislative Tracker: Daily Fantasy Sports, Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS RE-
PORT, supra note 60.
163. Patrick McGreevy, Bill legalizing fantasy sports websites in California makes it out
of state Assembly, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015, 1:24 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-
pol-sac-fantasy-sports-20160126-story.html [https://perma.cc/CNF9-PPGH].
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$50,000 licensing fee.164 And in Massachusetts, a series of proposed regu-
lations would among other things: prohibit persons under the age of
twenty-one from playing DFS; limit accounts to one per player; ban the
use of “scripts;” restrict advertising to minors; ban gameplay by employ-
ees and affiliates of DFS companies; and require identification of “highly-
experienced” players.165
While these proposed regulations certainly address legitimate state in-
terests, they are most likely preempted by the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA).166 PASPA makes it unlawful for a gov-
ernmental entity to:
[S]ponsor, operate, advertise, license, or authorize by law or compact
. . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering
scheme based, directly or indirectly . . . on one or more competitive
games in which amateur or professional athletes participate, or are
intended to participate, or on one of more performances of such ath-
letes in such games.”167
However, § 3703 limits the availability for filing civil actions to enjoin
violations of § 3702 to only the Unites States Attorney General and pro-
fessional and amateur sports organizations whose competitive games are
alleged to be the basis of the violation.168 While no court has analyzed the
issue of whether state-level regulation of DFS operators would violate
PASPA, a plain reading of the act indicates that states are preempted
from lawfully licensing and regulating DFS games.169
If there is one saving grace about PASPA for DFS operators, it is the
narrow restrictions on who may seek civil action to enjoin violations.170
While passage of PASPA was supported by sports leagues who feared
“Pete Rose type scandals,”171 the cozy relationship between professional
sports leagues and the DFS industry now makes it unlikely that profes-
sional sports league commissioners would avail themselves of their option
to enjoin DFS operators from offering contests featuring players in their
164. Dustin Gouker, Indiana Becomes Second State To Pass Daily Fantasy Sports Regu-
lation, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Mar. 24, 2016, 14:12), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/
9239/indiana-passes-dfs-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/C4SV-VFHT].
165. Draft Regulation 940 C.M.R 34.00: Daily Fantasy Sports Contest Operators in
Massachusetts, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 3, 5–6,
9–10, http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/regulations/proposed/940-cmr-34-draft.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E3D9-SHB4].
166. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 3701–3704 (2000).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2000) (emphasis added). Nevada, Delaware, Oregon, and Mon-
tana, are the only states that fall within PASPA’s grandfather provision exempting author-
ized government sponsored sports gambling in existence prior to PASPA’s passage. See 28
U.S.C. § 3704 (2000); Marc Edelman, Is it Legal To Run An NCAA Tournament Pool?,
FORBES (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2016/03/08/is-hosting-an-
ncaa-tournament-pool-legal/#108663e66a0f [https://perma.cc/599Z-EJPF].
168. 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2000).
169. Moore, supra note 160.
170. See 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2000).
171. Chil Woo, Note, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting The Professional And Amateur Sports
Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 575–76 (2013).
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respective leagues.172 In the fall of 2015, the NCAA and commissioners
for ten prominent football conferences privately requested that DraftK-
ings and FanDuel cease “offering fantasy games based on college sports
because they were inconsistent with our values, bylaws, rules and inter-
pretations regarding sports wagering.”173 Following completion of the
NCAA basketball tournament, both DraftKings and FanDuel voluntarily
agreed to stop taking bets on NCAA games—perhaps “avoiding a land-
slide of lawsuits the NCAA could have filed if [DraftKings and FanDuel]
continued to conduct college contests after winning state approval to do
business.”174
While it is likely that professional sports leagues will not object to
state-level violations of PASPA, a challenge initiated by the United States
Attorney General could result in a death penalty for the DFS industry.
State-level regulations will likely result in regulations with varying de-
grees of favorableness—frustrating the ability of DFS operators to con-
duct business in those jurisdictions with unfavorable regulations—but
that possibility has to be more palatable for DFS operators than a federal
challenge which could effectively terminate the industry overnight, as it
did with the online Internet poker industry. This begs the question of
whether the current, or a future, United States Attorney General would
initiate such action. One commentator has noted his belief that purely
consumer protection oriented legislation, like that proposed in Massachu-
setts, is not likely to result in a challenge because of the protective nature
of the legislation and because it does not “explicitly contain provisions
authorizing DFS in the state.”175 However, recently enacted and pro-
posed legislation, like in Indiana and California, go beyond just offering
mere consumer protections, and instead, explicitly license sports gam-
bling, thus seemingly running afoul of one of PASPA’s specific prohibi-
tions.176 The United States Attorney General’s continued silence on the
issue will only embolden some states to continue pursuing lucrative regu-
lation of DFS.
Despite the traditional deference to states for matters related to en-
forcement of gambling laws,177 the DraftKings data leak and instances of
DFS employees winning large sums of money on competitors’ sites178
might mark the proverbial line in the sand that causes the United States
172. See Harwell, supra note 4; DraftKings Becomes the Official Daily Fantasy Game of
Major League Baseball, supra note 12.
173. Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Distances Itself From Daily Fantasy Websites, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/sports/ncaa-distances-itself-from-daily-
fantasy-websites.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/NPU3-U9WX] (internal quotations omitted).
174. Evan Grossman, DraftKings, FanDuel agree to stop taking bets on college sports




176. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2000); Gouker, supra note 164; McGreevy, supra note
163.
177. See Moore, supra note 160.
178. See Drape & Williams, In Fantasy Sports, Signs of Insiders’ Edge, supra note 44.
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Attorney General to intervene. As noted in Part IV, the United States
Attorney’s office for the Southern District of New York is currently in the
early stages of an investigation into DraftKings and FanDuel, and their
findings will no doubt be persuasive as to what action, if any, the federal
government takes to shut down the industry.179 Congress is slated to hold
hearings in mid-May regarding the legality and nature of DFS, and the
issue of whether recent state DFS legislation is in conflict with PASPA
will likely be discussed.180 Given the multi-billion dollar size of the indus-
try and the significant negative externalities associated with gambling,
there is too much at stake for the federal government not to insert itself
into the matter—especially given PASPA’s, the UIGEA’s and the Wire
Act’s statutory invitations.
IV. THE FEDERAL RULES
The United States federal government has traditionally played a minor
role in the regulation of gaming—instead leaving regulation of the gam-
ing industry to the states.181 As one commentator has noted, “With the
primary exception of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act, rather than preempting state gambling laws, federal laws that govern
gambling crimes have been designed to aid individual states in the en-
forcement of state gambling laws.”182 However, existing federal legisla-
tion and historical precedence suggests that federal law enforcement
agents have recourse to shut down DFS operators.183 The Wall Street
Journal recently reported that Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney
for the Southern District of New York, is in the early stages of an investi-
gation into whether the business model behind DFS violates federal
law.184 This news alone should give DFS proponents some consternation.
Dubbed “Black Friday” by online poker enthusiasts, on April 15, 2011,
Bharara and Janice Fedarcyk, the Assistant Director in Charge of the
FBI’s New York Field Office, unsealed indictments charging eleven de-
fendants, including founders of the three largest Internet poker compa-
nies doing business in the United States, with violations of the federal
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA) and the
179. See infra Part IV.
180. See Chris Grove, Source: Congress to Examine Daily Fantasy Sports Issues In May
11 Committee Hearing, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Apr. 14, 2016, 9:54 PM), http://
www.legalsportsreport.com/9524/congressional-hearing-daily-fantasy-sports/ [https://
perma.cc/863E-5WJ3].
181. Andy Moore, What Nevada Action Means For Future of Daily Fantasy Sports,
LAW360 (Nov. 3, 2015, 12:43 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/722521/what-nevada-ac
tion-means-for-future-of-daily-fantasy-sports [https://perma.cc/8W3D-M2E7].
182. Moore, Does Regulation of Fantasy Sports Violate PAPSA?, supra note 160.
183. See Kerry O’Brien, Note, The Great Wildcard: How 2011 Shook The Online Poker
World And Became A Game-Changer In the Battle For Legalization, 38 J. LEGIS. 295, 296
(2012).
184. Devlin Barrett & Christopher M. Matthews, U.S. Prosecutor Probing Daily Fan-
tasy-Sports Business, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2015, 12:08 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-
s-prosecutor-probing-daily-fantasy-sports-business-1445400505 [https://perma.cc/PB8K-8C
6X].
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Illegal Gambling Business Act of 1970 (IGBA), as well as other bank and
wire fraud and money laundering offenses.185 Shortly after issuing the
indictments, the FBI seized the implicated websites’ domain names—ef-
fectively ending what had been a multi-billion dollar industry in the
United States.186 Interestingly, neither the UIGEA nor the IGBA by it-
self actually criminalizes Internet gambling; instead functioning as an en-
forcement act dependent upon a predicate violation of some other
federal or state anti-gambling law. On the other hand, the Interstate Wire
Act of 1961 could be construed in a manner that would both serve as an
independent basis for federal action, as well as the illegal violation of law
necessary to invoke enforcement under the IGBA and UIGEA.
A. THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT DID
NOT LEGALIZE DFS
Congress passed the UIGEA as part of a completely unrelated port
security bill in the final minutes before recessing for the 2006 election
period.187 Democratic Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey report-
edly remarked that “no one on the Senate-House Conference Committee
had even seen the final language of the bill.”188 As Congress’s first foray
into legislation targeting online gambling, the UIGEA is credited with
allegedly “[giving] birth to DFS when FanDuel CEO Nigel Eccles discov-
ered an exemption in the law for ‘skill-based’ fantasy sports games during
a trans-Atlantic flight in 2009.”189 A decade after its enactment, the
UIGEA remains controversial and misunderstood.190 As this section
shows, the UIGEA did not legalize DFS.
UIGEA § 5363 prohibits persons engaged in the business of “betting”
or “wagering” from knowingly accepting any financial instrument in con-
nection with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet
185. Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Principles of Three Largest Internet Poker Com-
panies with Bank Fraud, Illegal Gambling Offenses, and Laundering Billions in Illegal








187. I. Nelson Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006 Analyzed, 10 GAMING L. REV. 537, 537 (2006).
188. Id.
189. Kevin P. Braig, Federal law and the birth of daily fantasy sports, OHIO STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, https://www.ohiobar.org/NewsAndPublications/News/OSBANews/Pages/
Daily-fantasy-football-under-fire-part-1.aspx [https://perma.cc/36NY-A4X4] .
190. See e.g., Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Att’y Gen. of United States,
580 F.3d 113, 115–16 (3rd Cir. 2009) (upholding lower court ruling rejecting constitutional
vagueness challenge to the UIGEA); Nev. Att’y Gen. Memo, supra note 26, at 7 (distin-
guishing the Nevada AG’s office’s position from that of “some operators and commenta-
tors who have taken the position that the [UIGEA] legalized fantasy sports within the
United States.”).
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gambling.191 Articulated differently, the act “[p]rohibits Internet gam-
bling operators from accepting money related to any online gambling that
violates State or Federal law.”192 Much of the debate on the legality of
DFS centers on the oft-discussed “exemption” found in § 5362, which ex-
cludes from the definition of bet or wager participation in fantasy or sim-
ulation sports games where all of the following three criteria are met:
(I) All prizes and awards offered to winning participants are es-
tablished and made known to the participants in advance of
the game or contest and their value is not determined by the
number of participants or the amount of any fees paid by
those participants.
(II) All winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge and
skill of the participants and are determined predominantly
by accumulated statistical results of the performance of indi-
viduals (athletes in the case of sports events) in multiple real-
world sporting or other events.
(III) No winning outcome is based (aa) on the score, point-spread,
or any performance or performances of any single real-world
team or any combination of such teams; or (bb) solely on any
single performance of an individual athlete in any single real-
world sporting or other event.193
DFS seemingly meets the requirements in element (I) because prizes
are known to participants prior to the start of contests and prize amounts
are fixed regardless of the number of participants.194 In fact, depending
on the number of participants in a guaranteed prize pool contest, it is
possible for a DFS operator to collect less in entry fees than the guaran-
teed payout—thus losing money.195 Non-guaranteed prize pool contests
simply provide no guarantee that a contest will take place absent a mini-
mum number of participants (entry fees are refunded when contests are
cancelled for lack of reaching the minimum number of participants).196
However, it is debatable whether the exemption should even apply to
DFS. As Part III argues, element (II) should be inapplicable because
chance predominates over skill—meaning that all winning outcomes are
not based upon “the relative knowledge and skill of the participants.”197
191. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. §5363 (2006).
192. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 – Fact Sheet, STOP PREDA-
TORY GAMBLING FOUNDATION, http://stoppredatorygambling.org/blog/category/research-
center/internet-gambling/ [https://perma.cc/3JPV-QQBC].
193. 31 U.S.C. §5362(1)(E)(ix) (2016).
194. Nev. Att’y Gen. Memo, supra note 26, at 4.
195. Id.
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DFS contests presumably do not violate the requirements in element
(III) because winning outcomes are determined based on combinations of
individual athletes competing across multiple sporting events.
Assuming that the exemption does apply to DFS, DFS operators and
proponents mistakenly cite the § 5363 fantasy sports carve-out as legaliz-
ing pay-to-play DFS.198 DraftKings’s website proffers its legal interpreta-
tion that it “operates in compliance with federal law, including a statute
called the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, or UIGEA,
which exempts fantasy sports contests from its regulation.”199 But the Ne-
vada Attorney General calls this position “simply untenable.”200
Even accepting as true the premises that the legality of DFS is the same
as season-long fantasy sports and that DFS is a game of skill, the UIGEA
does not legalize daily fantasy sports, or even season-long fantasy sports.
In § 5361(b), titled “Rules of Construction,” UIGEA states: “No provi-
sion of [31 U.S.C. §§ 5361 et seq.] shall be construed as altering, limiting,
or extending any Federal or State law or Tribal-State compact prohibit-
ing, permitting, or regulating gambling within the United States.”201 As
the Nevada Attorney General concluded, “[The] UIGEA neither made
legal nor illegal any form of gambling within the United States,” but in-
stead “simply provides ‘[n]ew mechanisms for enforcing gambling laws on
the Internet,’ which Congress deemed necessary as it believed ‘traditional
law enforcement mechanisms [were] often inadequate for enforcing gam-
bling prohibitions or regulations on the Internet, especially where such
gambling crosses State or national borders.’”202 Commentators have
noted that “a federal exemption is not the legal equivalent of federal au-
thorization and comprehensive regulation”203 and the § 5363 exemption
“does not mean that fantasy sports are lawful, only that fantasy sports are
not criminalized under UIGEA.”204 Furthermore, “if the UIGEA had
truly authorized and comprehensively regulated DFS, then the DFS plat-
forms could safely offer DFS in all states because the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution would likely pre-empt any contradic-
tory state law.”205
Amidst fall 2015’s uproar over the information leak at DraftKings, for-
mer United States Representative Jim Leach, author of the UIGEA leg-
islation, stated that while lawmakers never conceived that DFS would
“morph into today’s cauldron of daily betting,” it would be “sheer
chutzpah for a fantasy sports company to cite the law as a legal basis for
198. See e.g., People v. Fanduel, Inc., 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4521 at *18–19 (N.Y.
Supp. Ct. Dec. 11, 2015).
199. Legality, DRAFTKINGS, https://www.draftkings.com/help/why-is-it-legal [https://
perma.cc/P7SF-Q6E2].
200. Nev. Att’y Gen. Memo, supra note 26, at 7.
201. 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2006).
202. Nev. Att’y Gen. Memo, supra note 26, at 7 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 5361(a)(4)) (em-
phasis added).
203. Braig, supra note 189.
204. Cabot & Csoka, supra note 64, at 1201.
205. Braig, supra note 189.
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existing.”206 In his view, the UIGEA merely provides fantasy sports an
“exemption from one law enforcement mechanism where the burden for
compliance has been placed on private sector financial firms.”207 As
noted earlier, it is debatable whether the UIGEA’s fantasy sports carve-
out provision is even applicable to daily fantasy sports. Representative
Leach said, “There is no credible way fantasy sports betting can be de-
scribed as not gambling” and “[o]nly a sophist can make such a claim.”208
Admittedly, prosecutors seeking to bring UIGEA violations against
DFS operators face an obstacle in that the Internet gambling at issue
must be unlawful.209 Merely using the Internet to gamble does not in and
of itself constitute a violation. “Unlawful Internet gambling” is defined in
§ 5362 as:
[P]lac[ing], receiv[ing] or otherwise knowingly transmit[ing] a bet or
wager by any means which involves the use, at least in part, of the
Internet where such bet or wager is unlawful under any applicable
Federal or State law . . . in which the bet or wager is initiated, re-
ceived, or otherwise made.210
However, given the rash of recent memoranda and opinions issued by
state attorneys general, federal prosecutors should have an abundance of
state-level gambling violations to cite should they choose to charge DFS
operators with UIGEA violations.211
B. THE INTERSTATE WIRE ACT
At the behest of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Congress
passed the Wire Act212 in 1961 to combat bookmaking operations related
to organized crime.213 In addition to assisting the various states in enforc-
ing their gambling laws and suppressing organized gambling activities, the
Wire Act provides a basis for independent federal action.214 Subsection
206. Tim Dahlberg, Author of anti-gambling law says “sheer chutzpah” for daily fantasy
sites to claim legitimacy, US NEWS (Oct. 12, 2015, 6:24 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/
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(a) provides:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering know-
ingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in inter-
state or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting
in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or
for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the re-
cipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.215
Courts have extended the Wire Act to encompass the Internet.216 The
applicability of the Wire Act as a means for prosecution of DFS operators
turns on two determinations. First, DFS contest entry fees must be classi-
fied as bets or wagers. Second, DFS play must be considered sports bet-
ting because in late 2011, the Department of Justice released a
memorandum which reversed its previous position that the Wire Act ap-
plied to both sports and non-sports betting alike, and now holds that the
Wire Act applies only to sports betting.217 The Fifth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in 2002, in In re MasterCard Intern. Inc., when it held
that the “plain language and legislative history of the Wire Act made its
application to sports betting abundantly clear.”218 As discussed in Part
III, this author predicts that courts will conclude that entry fees constitute
bets or wagers and that courts would deem the contests at issue as sport-
ing events.
Subsection (b) of the Wire Act contains a safe-harbor provision, but
this provision is most likely inapplicable to DFS as it applies only to the
transmission of information assisting in placing bets or wagers that origi-
nate and terminate in states where such betting is legal, as opposed to the
actual bets or wagers themselves.219
C. THE ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS ACT
The Illegal Gambling Business Act of 1970 was enacted as part of the
broader Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and it criminalized illegal
gambling businesses at the federal level.220 An illegal gambling business is
one that (1) violates the laws of a State in which it is conducted; (2) in-
volves five or more persons in the business; and (3) “remains in substan-
tially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a
215. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (emphasis added). A “wire communication facility” is defined
as “any and all instrumentalities, personnel, and services . . . used or useful in the transmis-
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gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.”221 Similar to the UIGEA, the
ability for federal prosecutors to prosecute DFS operators for violations
of the IGBA hinges on first finding a predicate violation of a state-level
gambling law. As one commentator explains, “[E]ven with the exemption
for fantasy sports in the UIGEA, DFS operators who operate in states
where DFS has been determined to violate state gambling laws . . . could
be charged by a federal prosecutor with violating the IGBA.”222 The
IGBA thus provides another avenue for federal prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this comment is to argue that DFS contests likely con-
stitute illegal gambling based on existing state and federal law and not to
argue that DFS should be unlawful on account of policy reasons. If out-
lawed, DFS proponents could point out the fallacy that many states ex-
plicitly sanction gambling in the form of state-run lotteries. Returning to
the analogy of a skill versus chance spectrum, it seems paradoxical that
100% chance-based, state-run lottery games could be legal, but not DFS
contests (conceding that at least some element of skill is present in DFS).
It would thus be logical to rationalize that states should be allowed to
permit partially skill-based DFS contests if they are allowed to permit
pure-chance based contests. Or similarly, that states should be allowed to
permit DFS contests if they are allowed to permit on-site gambling at
casinos and horse tracks.
However, several factors distinguish DFS from existing forms of legal
gambling, which merit either an outright federal ban or federal regulation
(assuming PASPA is first repealed). First, because the Internet is the me-
dium for the gambling, DFS participants have near constant access to the
means with which to gamble, as opposed to the physical presence re-
quired with brick and mortar casinos. The “gamble from your bedroom”
option heightens the challenge for gambling addicts fighting the compul-
sive urge to gamble. Second, DFS’s use of the Internet reduces the ability
of DFS operators to prevent minors from entering contests. Third, if the
statistics that indicate that most DFS contests are won by the same small
subset of participants is true, then there are fundamental issues of unfair-
ness present in DFS not found in pure chance games like in state lotter-
ies. Lastly, leaving it up to the states to regulate DFS would likely result
in wide disparities between the levels of consumer protection offered in
the various states. While some states might opt to ban the games outright,
others might implement strict regulatory laws. But with the Internet as
the gambling medium, there is the potential for either participants or op-
erators to circumvent the laws of DFS unfriendly states. As noted earlier,
the FBI is investigating whether DraftKings encouraged and accepted
bets from participants in states where DFS is prohibited.223 Perhaps fu-
221. Id. at § 1955(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
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ture commentators will explore whether DFS’s nexus with the Internet
preempts states from regulating DFS under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.
If the future of DFS is legalization and regulation, then regulation
should encompass robust consumer protections. Gambling in a casino
does not limit oneself to binding arbitration, but gambling in online DFS
does.224 Is the DFS industry one where we really want people to waive
their right to sue directly? Today, the worst punishment an employee who
violates DraftKings’s policy not to compete on competitors’ DFS web-
sites faces is termination. But consider the consequences an investment
banker would face if they used proprietary or inside information to make
personal trades. There are certainly parallels between insider trading and
using non-publically available player ownership percentages. Civil and
criminal sanctions are needed to ensure fairness and transparency be-
tween DFS operators and players. One also has to wonder whether the
Fantasy Sports Control Agency will be effective, and if the industry
should even be allowed to regulate itself. Imagine the outcry if account-
ing firms or investment banks were allowed to band together to establish
their own non-governmental regulatory agencies. Lastly, we should ask
ourselves if we are comfortable with an industry where skilled players are
arguably allowed to exploit advantages over regular players. As a multi-
billion dollar industry, encompassing strong negative externalities, the na-
ture of DFS demands that a single, cohesive legal solution is needed—
and that solution is best provided by the federal government.
224. See Phillips, supra note 49.
